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Iowa Lawyer Search - Listings for Finch Jason M
Name: Finch Jason M
Address: 1317 Broadway Denison, IA 51442
Phone Number: 712-263-4245
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Cases related to this attorney's specialties:
IN RE:STEVE ROBINSON v. USCA6 Opinion 01b0007p.06 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2001 FED App. 0007P (6th Cir.) File Name: 01b0007p.06 BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT In re: STEVE D. ROBINSON, Debtor. STEVE D. ROBINSON, Appellant, v. No. 00-8088 CHAMPAIGN LANDMARK, INC., Appellee. Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, at Columbus. No. 99-57410. Argued: June 13, 2001 Decided and Filed: August 21, 2001 Before: BROWN, MORGENSTERN-CLARREN, and RHODES, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges. COUNSEL ARGUED: Grady L. Pettigrew, Jr., COX, STEIN & PETTIGREW, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Ray A. Cox, COX & GINGER, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Grady L. Pettigrew, Jr., COX, STEIN & PETTIGREW, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Ray A. Cox, COX & GINGER, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee. OPINION WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. The Debtor appeals the bankruptcy court's order overruling his objection to the claim of Champaign Landmark, Inc. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the bankruptcy court. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion or erred when it decided that there were no grounds warranting revocation of the arbitration award and whether the bankruptcy court erred when it ruled that res judicata barred the Debtor's objection to Landmark's claim. As a part of these issues, there is a question of whether the bankruptcy court erred by denying the Debtor an opportunity to present evidence in support of his legal arguments. II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction over final orders of the bankruptcy courts of the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and (c). The bankruptcy court's order disposing of Landmark's claim is a final appealable order, because it "'ends the litigation on the me...
HERSHEY FOODS CORP v AGRI, U.S. DC Circuit Court of AppealsHERSHEY FOODS CORP v AGRI United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued April 18, 2002 Decided June 18, 2002 No. 01-5169 Hershey Foods Corporation, Appellant v. Department of Agriculture, Appellee Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (99cv02138) Andrew G. McBride argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Eve J. Klindera. Robert M. Reese entered an appearance. Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney. Before: Sentelle, Randolph and Garland, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph. Randolph, Circuit Judge: Hershey Foods Corporation ap- peals the dismissal of its complaint seeking to vacate a portion of the Department of Agriculture's regulation estab- lishing pricing classifications of milk used in the manufacture of milk chocolate. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that legislation converted the regulation into a statute, not subject to judicial review under the Administra- tive Procedure Act. Although we disagree with the district court in this respect, we hold that dismissal was proper because Hershey failed to exhaust its administrative reme- dies. I. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 ("AMAA"), empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to regu- late the sale of milk by geographic region. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5). Over the years, the Secretary issued many milk marketing orders, applying to different geographic regions and classifying milk according to the "form in which or the purpose for which it is used." 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(A). By 1998, there were thirty-one milk marketing orders in effect. See Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas: Proposed Rule and Opportun...
PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT -* EARL C. MCDANIELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.No. 01-2086 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. -* -* RANDOLPH F. LOVETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.No. 01-2087 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. -* -* ALTON E. BROWN, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v.No. 01-2088 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. -* Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, District Judge. (CA-00-1482-4-12, CA-00-2053-4-12, CA-00-2054-4-12) Argued: May 7, 2002 Decided: July 29, 2002 Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson joined. Judge Luttig wrote a dissenting opinion. _ COUNSEL ARGUED: Keith Moss Babcock, LEWIS, BABCOCK & HAW- KINS, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. John Berk- ley Grimball, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James H. Renfrow, Jr., Dillon, South Carolina, for Appellants. J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. _ OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: The Secretary of Agriculture denied the applications of farmers Earl McDaniels, Randolph Lovett, and Alton Brown for livestock disaster relief because each farmer's 1997 gross revenue exceeded $2.5 million, making him ineligible for assistance under applicable Department of Agriculture regulations. In this action, brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, the farmers challenge these regula- tions, contending that they are arbitrary and capricious because gross revenue is defined to include pass-through funds - in this case, sales of bailment tobacco - in which the farmers had no interest. The district court held that the applicable regulations were "reason- ab...
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